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Abstract
Following the events of September 11, Japan renewed its
stance against terrorism and aggressively stepped up regu-
lations against aliens including asylum seekers. Respond-
ing to the post-September 11 detention of Afghan asylum
seekers, citizens of all walks of life joined forces. The Free
Afghan Refugees movement not only succeeded in releas-
ing detainees, but also broke new ground by pushing for
reform of the Japanese asylum system for the first time in
the twenty-one years since the Refugee Recognition Act
was enacted. The success and propagation of their activ-
ism is a reflection of the maturity attained by the refugee
rights movement in Japan, and the increased awareness
among citizens about world issues. On an unprecedented
scale, citizens are questioning the government’s efforts to
maintain a homogeneous social order.
Résumé
À la suite des attentats du 11 septembre, le Japon a
réitéré sa position contre le terrorisme et a vigoureuse-
ment renforcé ses règlements contre les étrangers, y com-
pris les demandeurs d’asile. Cependant, lorsque des
demandeurs d’asile afghans ont été détenus après le 11
septembre, des citoyens provenant de toutes les couches
sociales ont fait cause commune. Le mouvement
« Libérez les réfugiés afghans » (« Free Afghan Refu-
gees ») réussit non seulement à obtenir la libération des
détenus, mais innova aussi en réclamant la réforme du
système d’asile japonais pour la première fois depuis les
21 années d’existence de la Loi sur la reconnaissance des
réfugiés (« Refugee Recognition Act »). Le succès et la
propagation du militantisme attestent du degré de ma-
turité atteint par le mouvement pour les droits des
réfugiés au Japon et de la sensibilisation accrue des ci-
toyens envers les grandes questions mondiales. Comme
jamais auparavant, les citoyens remettent en question les
efforts du gouvernement pour préserver un ordre social
homogène.
Ever since I was a kid, I’d always imagined that Japan was the
most peaceful country in the world … I was taught that after the
Hiroshima bombing, Japanese people came to love peace. Ever
since I was born I’ve seen nothing but war. I grew up seeing
people being killed right in front of me.…1
I thought if I came to Japan, I would be safe and would be able
to make a future for myself. But instead, as soon as I arrived here
I was detained and treated like a criminal…. All we think about
is our family. We don’t know where they are, how they are
…whether they are alive or dead… All we can do while in
detention is to keep watching the horrible news on TV about
the US bombing our hometown … We just hope and pray
nothing has happened to them. (Afghan detainee, Hazara, male,
in his twenties).2
Right after September 11th, I found out that one of my acquain-
tances was killed in the World Trade Center. I thought some-
thing was wrong with this world and started to become involved
in social activism for the first time in my life. That is how I came
to know about detained Afghan asylum seekers. Until then, I
was just an “ordinary citizen.” When I heard the term “refu-
gees,” I just imagined these people starving in the refugee camps
in Asia and Africa. They are part of something happening far
away from me. I would never have thought that there are people
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who come to Japan seeking “asylum.” … But look at me now,
I’m in the middle of the Free Afghan refugee movement …
Why? Because I came to realize that my life, which I take for
granted, exists at the expense of these people … A society not
livable for refugees is not livable for us Japanese, either. 
(Japanese businessman, in his thirties).3
The first comment was made by an Afghan asylum seeker
who was detained by the Japanese immigration bureau for
seven months, and the second comment was made by a
young Japanese activist who became involved in the move-
ment to free them after September 11. While the plight of
detainees languishing in places like Woomera, Australia,
has made international headlines since 2001, neither the
trauma that these Afghan asylum seekers faced in Japan nor
the support they garnered from citizens has been widely
recognized. In the early morning hours of October 3, 2001,
soon after September 11 and the Bush administration’s
declaration on war against terrorism, some forty Japanese
police and Immigration Bureau officials armed with bullet-
proof vests raided the residences of nine Afghan asylum
seekers in Chiba, and transported them to the immigration
detention facility in Jujo, Tokyo. The police and immigra-
tion officials allegedly confiscated computers and cell
phones from the residents, and even examined their per-
sonal diaries. These asylum seekers, most of them minority
Hazaras,4 were allegedly arrested under suspicion of terror-
ism, and were detained under poor medical conditions with
no prospect of release, and many of them attempted to
commit suicide. This provoked widespread criticism
among Japanese citizens, and many lawyers, Christian ac-
tivists, journalists, and young activists became mobilized to
found the Network to Free Afghan Refugees (AFNET).5
What is most remarkable about this movement is that a
considerable number6 of young and mainstream citizens
were involved, many participating in such activism for the
first time in their lives. At the same time, their movement,
which started out as a campaign against the detention of
Afghan asylum seekers, has not only succeeded in securing
the release of a number of detainees, but has also evolved
into a whole new effort to push for the reformation of the
Japanese asylum system itself. The revised Immigration
Control and Refugee Recognition Bill,7 – though with many
problems – ostensibly advocating the prevention of deten-
tion and deportation of asylum seekers is now about to be
submitted by the Cabinet to the Diet, the Japanese par-
liament. Japan, a country that has long practised exclu-
sionary immigration and asylum policy in maintaining
its self-proclaimed status as a “homogeneous society,” is
finally facing major pressure for change by its citizens
claiming that only “a society livable for foreigners is livable
for all.”
In this paper, I will first discuss the pre-September 11
policy on detention of asylum seekers, and how regulations
against aliens including asylum seekers were gradually
tightened in recent years, followed by the impact of Septem-
ber 11 given the new agenda of countering terrorism, the
success of Free Afghans and asylum system reform move-
ment, and finally analyze what factors contributed to the
dramatic propagation of the movement after September 11.
Japanese Seclusionist Policy
Japan ratified the Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees (hereinafter Refugee Convention)8 and its Protocol9 in
1981, and enacted the Immigration Control and Refugee
Recognition Act (hereinafter Immigration Act)10 shortly af-
terward. Japan, home country to former United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Sadako Ogata,
is the second-largest donor to the UNHCR following the
U.S., with many of its nationals all over the world devoted
to international cooperation on such issues as refugee assis-
tance. However, asylum seekers in Japan have faced severe
circumstances. Between 1981 and the end of 2002, twenty-
one years since ratification of the Refugee Convention, Japan
has only recognized 305 out of a total of 2,782 applicants. In
2001, the year the nine Afghans mentioned above were
detained, 353 people applied for refugee status – the highest
in nineteen years – with only twenty-six recognized. Most
applicants for refugee status were Afghans – almost one
hundred – yet only three were recognized.11 The number of
refugees Japan admits every year has been the lowest among
all G7 countries. Further, in comparing the numbers of
refugees hosted to a number of other variables, Japan is
ranked 136th internationally in relation to GDP, 125 th in
relation to population size, and 90th in relation to geographic
size, at the end of 2000.12 At the same time, even before
September 11, refugee advocates have long claimed that the
Japanese asylum system itself contains considerable flaws
with potentials of serious human rights violations such as
detentions of asylum seekers without a time limit and depor-
tations to home countries where there is fear of persecution.
Pre-September 11: Detention of Asylum Seekers
Under Japan’s Immigration Act, any alien who arrives with-
out proper documentation, including those who sub-
sequently seek asylum, must be detained. Amnesty
International reported in 2002 that a daily average of seven
persons are detained at the Landing Prevention Facilities
(LPFs) (or “Airport Rest House”) in Narita Airport alone.13
On the other hand, since the Japanese government does not
provide any particular visa to refugee applicants, in-country
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applicants without valid documents at the time of applica-
tion also face detention and deportation. (Those who do
have visas at the time of application for refugee status may
have their visas extended during this initial application, but
not during appeal. These individuals therefore face deten-
tion and deportation). In contrast, in the years before Sep-
tember 11, those without visas at the time of application
normally had deportation procedures suspended and were
therefore not detained until their initial application was
denied.14
Once in the immigration detention facilities, detainees
may request provisional release to the immigration bureau
in exchange for bail provided that there is “no possibility of
the detainees’ running away,” and in light of such factors as
detainees’ health. However, before September 11, provi-
sional release was usually granted only when the applicant
had been detained for several months or close to a year.
These practices have garnered criticisms by the UNHCR,
refugee advocates, and lawyers as contradictory to internat-
ional law and standards, including the Refugee Convention
Article 33 (non-refoulement); Article 31, which exempts
refugees from punishment due to illegal entry or presence;
UNHCR Detention Guidelines,15 which stipulate that de-
tention of refugees be neither automatic nor unduly pro-
longed; and UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion
44,16 which states that detention of asylum seekers “should
normally be avoided.” Reflecting these criticisms, the de-
tention of asylum seekers had been decreasing from 1999
to 2000 until the wake of September 11 when the Japanese
authority joined the international campaign against terror-
ism advocated by the Bush administration – in which im-
migration and national security became inextricably linked.
According to the UNHCR, in 2001, the year nine Afghans
were detained, the percentage of asylum seekers detained in
Japan reached levels considerably higher than those of other
industrialized nations, with the exception of Australia.17
Tokyo Lawyers League for Afghan Refugees, a Japanese
lawyers group established after September 11, reported that
in February 2002, at least fifty asylum seekers were detained
in immigration bureau facilities in Tokyo, Ibaraki, Osaka,
and other areas.18
Pre-September 11: Aliens as Security Issues
Actually, even before September 11 Japanese authorities,
specifically the Immigration Bureau and the police, had been
tightening regulations against aliens in an effort to prevent
“international organized crimes” that threaten domestic se-
curity. Especially since the late 1990s, the police have played
a significant role in Japan’s immigration control policy by
arresting aliens for violations of immigration law. Refugee
and migrant advocates claim that reason for this is the
deep-rooted idea that Japanese social order is based on the
homogeneity of Japanese society. For example, in 1997,
when Chinese smuggling was a big issue, many government
officials expressed concern about the “threats posed by ille-
gal migrants and smugglers to the social order.” The Chief
of the Investigation Bureau of the National Police Associa-
tion, on the increasing number of aliens, asserted that “Japa-
nese society … is completely unprepared for these people.”19
While the police had been claiming that undocumented
aliens “were responsible for the increasing number of felo-
nious crimes committed by foreigners,” there is no valid
ground for this claim. The events of September 11 in this
sense did not suddenly change Japanese immigration policy.
Rather, they strengthened the already close relationship be-
tween the police and immigration authorities via the new
common agenda of countering terrorism.20 At the same
time, in November 2001, the immigration control act was
revised, which enabled the government to deny entry to
those who “may disturb international conferences or sports
tournaments (such as soccer hooligans)” at the port of the
entry, and to deport those who committed certain crimes
once considered minor. Behind this reform lies an ongoing
attempt by the Japanese government to share information
about terrorists with other governments.
Post September 11: Detention of Afghan Asylum
Seekers
It was then in this context that on October 3, 2001, the
Japanese police and Immigration Bureau officials in coop-
eration raided the nine Afghan asylum seekers and detained
them in Jujo, Tokyo. Those who were arrested had not even
had their initial application denied, in contradiction to the
detention practices in previous years. While they were pri-
marily arrested for violation of immigration laws, it is clear
that they were suspected of being connected with the Tali-
ban, the fundamentalist Islamic army led by Mohammad
Omar, or al Qaeda, the international Islamic army led by
Osama bin Laden. In fact, on September 17, prior to the
detention of the nine Afghans, the Immigration Bureau
requested that Afghan refugee applicants, including several
of the nine individuals, appear at the Tokyo Immigration
Bureau. Bureau staff interrogated the refugee applicants,
asking them whether they were related to Taliban members
or knew anything about Osama bin Laden.21 Shortly after the
arrest of the nine Afghans, a ministerial meeting on anti-ter-
rorism measures22 was held. It was decided that it was vital
to arrest “illegal aliens who may be related to terrorist or-
ganizations.” However, the Justice Ministry failed to provide
any evidence of the aliens’ relationship with any terrorist
organizations, and instead began claiming that the nine
Afghans were actually economic refugees or migrant work-
Volume 21 Refuge Number 3
36
ers pretending to be refugees.23 Ironically, not only were the
arrested Afghans uninvolved with any terrorist organiza-
tions, but they were actually from the main group of people
persecuted by the Taliban regime. This incident itself shows
a lack of awareness on the part of the Immigration Bureau
concerning the situation in Afghanistan. The Immigration
Bureau, in interviews with the ethnically Haraza Afghan
asylum seekers, allegedly employed Pashtun and Tadzhik
interpreters. In Afghanistan, these ethnic groups have his-
torically been antagonistic against Hazaras, putting the asy-
lum seekers at a tremendous disadvantage.
Hearing the extraordinary news of the arbitrary deten-
tion of asylum seekers still in the process of initial applica-
tion, a group of refugees and migrants rights lawyers
founded the Tokyo Lawyers League for Afghan Refugees
(hereinafter Lawyers League), and claimed the illegality,
according to international law and standards, of the Af-
ghans’ detention. However, by the end of November, all
nine were denied refugee status, and were eventually sent to
the immigration detention center in Ushiku, Ibaraki.24
Birth of AFNET and Release of Detainees
After the five asylum seekers were detained in Ushiku, the
Lawyers League discovered a total of twenty-three Afghan
asylum seekers detained in the same facility, most of them
minority Hazaras in their late teens and twenties. Many had
arrived in the summer and fall of 2001, and were detained at
the airport while filing their application for refugee status.
They were subsequently sent to Ushiku and detained for
months. Until discovered by the Lawyers League, most were
without contact with the outside world, and had not been
notified of their right to legal representation. The Lawyers
League immediately filed suits to nullify or cancel the depor-
tation order that had been issued to them, as well as made
requests for provisional release to the Immigration Bureau.
However, the Immigration Bureau responded that given the
instability of Afghanistan, deportation was not possible, and
declared that the detainees remain in detention until it be-
came possible to deport them.
On the other hand, almost all the detained Afghan asy-
lum seekers suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), because of the persecution they experienced in
Afghanistan. PTSD patients, when put in situations similar
to those in which the initial traumas occurred, suffer from
symptoms such as flashbacks and headaches. Detention in
a small cell, which many of the detainees have experienced
while being persecuted by the Taliban, reawakened their
traumatic experiences. Due to uncertainty about their fu-
tures because of indefinite detention and worries about
their families, by March 2002, a total of fourteen asylum
seekers had attempted to commit suicide by overdosing
on sleeping drugs, attempted hanging, and burning them-
selves.25
Everyday, we are losing our minds. … The Taliban kill us in one
moment, but here, we are being killed day by day, little by little.
We do not know when we can get out. Back in Afghanistan I
never thought of killing myself – I thought it was such a stupid
idea … you know why? Because you’re going be killed anyway.
But after I experienced the Japanese detention center, I under-
stand now so well why someone would want to end his life.
    (Afghan asylum seeker, Hazara, male, in his twenties).26
Detainees were only allowed to bathe and exercise three
times a week (less than one hour each time) in the detention
center;27 as a result, detainees suffered from scabies and
different deceases. Doctors stationed at the detention center
were often inaccessible,28 and the medical care provided was
problematic;29 when the detainees asked for medicine, the
doctor allegedly did not limit the quantity, with the result
that detainees took excessive amount of sleeping pills. De-
tainees needed advance permission to see outside doctors,
and some detainees later said that they were handcuffed on
the way to the doctor. Some detainees claimed that they
were verbally abused by detention officers, who allegedly
demanded that the detainees address them as “sensei” (in
Japanese, “teacher”) and made such statements as, “Why
did you come to Japan? Go back to your own country.”30
Many demonstrated their dissatisfaction by hunger strikes
and self-mutilation.
In response to this situation, on December 25, the Net-
work to Support Afghan Refugees (AFNET), a network of
citizens consisting of organizations such as the Lawyers
League, Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ),
Christian Coalition for Refugees and Migrant Workers
(CCRMW), the newly founded youth group Chance!, and
individuals such as journalists, was established.
Members of AFNET lobbied Diet members, held forums
and press conferences, visited detainees periodically, con-
ducted a letter-writing campaign to detainees as well as the
Justice Minister, and conducted rallies. A petition to free
the detainees was circulated; more than 5,400 signatures
were gathered from all over Japan. The network, in collabo-
ration with Christian and lawyers’ groups in Osaka which
had been supporting many Afghan asylum seekers, was
strengthened and enabled AFNET to conduct its national
campaign.
In response to AFNET lobbying, groups of Diet members
visited and investigated the Ushiku detention center, as well
as criticized the immigration authority in the Diet. On
February 21, 2002, UNHCR published a press release con-
demning the detention, stating “…it is UNHCR’s view that
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the detainees should be released under alternative arrange-
ment until their return becomes possible in safety. UNHCR
believes that their prolonged detention only adds to the
suffering of these people.”31 In addition, major newspapers
in Japan reported on the plight of Afghans languishing in
detention.32
On March 1, 2002, the Tokyo district court made the
historical decision to suspend the deportation order, as a
result releasing seven Afghan detainees and recognizing
them as refugees.33 The court decision stated that the detainees
were recognized as “refugees … with well-founded fear of
persecution, and should be provided appropriate protec-
tion.” Detention, the court continued, would “only further
give them immeasurable pains.” By April 26, less than two
months after the decision, all twenty-three Afghan de-
tainees gained provisional release from the Ushiku deten-
tion center. According to the Lawyers League, in 2000 the
Immigration Bureau detained 2,214 aliens, and only nine
detainees gained provisional release, which is only 0.4 per
cent. This figure demonstrates how extraordinary the
release was.
On the other hand, AFNET and other supporters faced a
new challenge. The Japanese government did not provide
residency status, accommodations, or medical care to the
former detainees. Christian organizations such as the
Catholic Commission of Japan for Migrants, Refugees and
People on the Move (J-CARM), and CCRMW therefore
collected donations from churches and citizens, and
through the Japan Association for Refugees (JAR) provided
the released Afghans with shelter (most of it owned by
churches) and funds to cover living expenses. JAR in coop-
eration with such organization as International Social Serv-
ices Japan (ISSJ) provided everyday assistance. It is
important to note that though very small and not politically
organized,34 there is a community of Afghans settled in the
Chiba area, which has eased the former detainees’ adapta-
tion to Japanese society. Some of the Afghans who them-
selves had gained residency as refugees put tremendous
effort into acting as liaisons between the detainees and
lawyers and NGO workers before and after the refugees’
release.
At the same time AFNET, despite concerns about the
possible negative effects of the media presence,35 on the
whole encouraged former detainees to express themselves
through television, newspapers, and magazines. In terms of
public advocacy this led to fairly positive outcome. For
example, a series of television Asahi programs in which a
nineteen-year-old Afghan attending a local Japanese jun-
ior high school expressed his desire to stay in Japan in
order to keep studying attracted much sympathy from
mainstream citizens, who had a limited and sometimes
biased image about the people of Afghanistan. Also, it can
be said that this heightened public attention worked to
prevent the re-detention of seven Afghans in July 2002.36
Shengyang Incident and the Development of the
Law Reform Movement
In May 2002, the government of Japan was at the center of
an international controversy. Chinese police officers force-
fully prevented a North Korean family (which included a
two-year-old child) from seeking asylum at the compound
of the Japanese consulate in Shengyang, China. The Japanese
government desperately argued that China violated the 1963
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.37 However, it
was later revealed that the Japanese consulate officials them-
selves did not resist the police, and even went as far to
indirectly assist them. It is clear that, by assisting the police,
these officials were being complicit in China’s violation of
the non-refoulement principle. Before the incident, the then-
Japanese ambassador to China allegedly told the consulate
officials to kick out any “suspicious persons” coming into
the compound, an act representative of Japan’s extreme
resistance toward asylum.38
The incident sparked widespread criticism against Ja-
pan’s policy on asylum, and the AFNET-led “free Afghan
detainees movement” therefore evolved into a movement
to review Japan’s asylum law. In June 2002, the Network for
Refugee Law Reform-Japan (REFNET)39 was established by
the citizens involved in AFNET with a broader goal of
revising asylum law and policies in Japan. REFNET held a
series of forums on refugee law reform for both citizens and
Diet members, as well as conducted lobbying efforts.
REFNET published a booklet titled “Beyond Seclusionist
Japan” targeted to a wide range of people which compre-
hensively addressed the problems and suggested alterna-
tives to the current refugee policy.40
In response to the public criticism, on June 11, 2002, the
Ministry of Justice established a Special Working Group on
Refugee Issues41 under the Justice Minister’s Private Coun-
cil on Immigration Control Policy. Justice Minister Mori-
yama, in her opening address at the Council on June 11,
stated that “given the drastic change in world order, globali-
zation, and rising public awareness on refugee issues, it is
crucial for our Ministry to review … and improve our
refugee recognition system.” On November 1, the working
group published a progress report on their review of the
refugee recognition system,42 which stated that the various
amendments proposed in the report are “messages to indi-
cate to the international society that Japan will be more
positive in accepting refugees from now on.”43 The progress
report made a remarkable proposal on the issue of deten-
tion and deportation of asylum seekers. The report pro-
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posed to provide a provisional legal status to refugee appli-
cants, until their appeal is turned down so that those with-
out valid documents will not be deported and detained for
their illegal stay. As of February 2003, the bill is about to be
approved in the Cabinet and submitted to the Diet. Though
there is certainly some room for criticism of the bill, such
as the strict conditions it requires for obtaining provisional
legal status, discussion of such criticisms is outside the
scope of my paper (see note 43). What is important here is
that the Ministry of Justice seems to be finally changing its
attitude, if only slowly.
Historical Analysis of the Post-September 11
Movement
I have so far provided an overview of citizens’ activism in
Japan for refugee rights in the aftermath of September 11. I
would now like to explore why this movement has been so
successful and what contributed to the propagation of
movement beyond generation. In order to do this, I would
like to briefly trace the evolution of the refugee rights move-
ment in the past twenty years. First of all, it should be noted
that though there are many Japanese humanitarian and
development NGOs engaged in aiding and assisting refugees
abroad, organizations concerned with refugees within Japan
are comparatively few.
With the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, so-called “boat
people” started to arrive in Japan, and the Japanese govern-
ment, responding to pressure from foreign governments,
decided to admit the Indo-Chinese refugees for resettle-
ment exceptionally on an annual quota basis through a
cabinet understanding (about 10,600 were admitted from
1979 to 2000). In Japan these Indo-Chinese refugees are
clearly distinguished from those who go through the official
refugee recognition procedure based on the Refugee Con-
vention which Japan ratified in 1981. Their resettlement
procedure, though difficult, is considered to be fairly suc-
cessful. The extensive media coverage of the Vietnam War
led to a heightened awareness of the condition of these
refugees, as did a strong anti-war movement in Japan. It is
possible that since many Japanese citizens still had a direct
memory of World War II, this too contributed to a generally
sympathetic attitude toward the refugees.
These Indo-Chinese refugees were provided full social
services by the government such as accommodation, edu-
cation, health, and job training by government, and many
citizens’ groups and non-governmental organizations sup-
ported them. Specifically, the role played by Catholic
churches and organizations was remarkable.44 As early as
1975, in response to a UN request, Caritas Japan, a relief
agency of the Catholic Church, started to provide tempo-
rary shelters for Vietnamese refugees rescued from the sea,
and since 1979, in cooperation with governmental organi-
zations, has provided land for resettlement assistance cen-
tres for the refugees. In 1982, the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of Japan set up the Special National Committee
for the Settlement of Refugees (renamed the Committee for
the Settlement of Refugees), and each diocese began to
provide help for the refugees within its territory. This Com-
mittee was later absorbed into the Japan Catholic Commis-
sion for International Cooperation (renamed the
Commission of Japan for Migrants, Refugees and People on
the Move), which played an important role in assisting
Afghan refugees after September 11. In addition, it has been
noted that many Catholics were involved in refugee assis-
tance on an individual basis, such as language education
and mental care.45
After the surge of Indo-Chinese refugees was settled, the
Committee for International Cooperation Archdiocese of
Osaka established a Refugee Help Desk in 1993. The organi-
zation originally assisted convention refugees such as those
from Sudan and Ethiopia, and started to support Afghan
refugees in 1999;46 their experience contributed to the birth
of AFNET. This involvement of Catholic churches and
Catholics in the protection of refugees can be understood
in the context of Christian egalitarianism, as well as their
worldwide endeavour to assist refugees and migrants since
the Pope declared solidarity with these individuals. At the
same time, it is important to note that there were quite a
few Catholics among the refugees (30 to 35 per cent in the
case of the Vietnamese refugees) coming into Japan.47
Meanwhile, Protestant churches have been less organized
in terms of commitments to refugee issues. Even the Chris-
tian Coalition for Refugees and Migrant Workers
(CCRMW), established in 1989 as Japan’s national inter-
denominational network of Christians including Protestants
and Catholics concerned with refugees and migrant rights,
only began its focus on refugees after September 11, when they
became involved in the activities of AFNET and REFNET.
Turning to non-Christian groups, Amnesty Interna-
tional’s Japanese Section founded the “Refugee Team” as
early as 1992, which not only acted in concert with AI’s
global campaign in support of refugees, but also engaged in
advocacy activities directed at Japanese refugee policy. The
team also assisted asylum seekers in the representation of
their cases by providing reports on the human rights situ-
ation in each country; however, their “no-work-on-own-
country” principle has prevented the organization as a
whole from taking action on individual cases. It should be
noted that although the Refugee Recognition Act was en-
acted in 1982, the number of people applying for refugee
status as well as those recognized remained very small until
1995. It was 1996 when the number of refugee applicants
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went up dramatically; it doubled from 52 in 1995 to 147 in
1996.48 This led to an increased number of asylum seekers
who pursued lawsuits after their appeals were rejected, and
the lawyers who became involved in defending asylum
seekers’ rights, many of them working pro bono, established
the Japan Lawyers Network for Refugees (JLNR) in 1997.
In 1999, given the fact that unlike the Indo-Chinese refu-
gees there were hardly any social services available for those
who went through refugee recognition procedure whether
recognized or denied, the Japan Association for Refugees
(JAR) was established; JAR is the first NGO which special-
izes in assisting individual asylum seekers and refugees in
Japan by providing legal and social services. By 2000, the
Working Group on Refugee Assistance in Japan (RAJA),
which includes JLNR and JAR, was established within PAR
in AC Japan, a partnership network between UNHCR and
Japanese NGOs working on refugees.
In response to the spread of support, some remarkable
changes started to appear on the administration side: the
Justice Ministry has been granting an increasing number of
asylum seekers since 1998 (it jumped from one person in
the previous four years to fifteen in 1998). In addition, in
recent years, there have been revolutionary court cases in
which asylum seekers as plaintiffs have won the cases. The
pre-September 11 movement to support refugees had been
coming to a rapid maturation, and represents an important
context in which the birth of AFNET and REFNET after
September 11 must be seen. The post-September 11 deten-
tion of Afghan asylum seekers provided an emotionally
charged and publicly visible issue which critically stimu-
lated the refugee rights movement on a national level. The
mobilization after September 11 has cut across profes-
sional, denominational, and generational lines. It is impor-
tant to note that REFNET was established as Japan’s first
NGO led by ordinary citizens, whose primary goal is the
reform of Japan’s asylum policies and system.
In addition to the mission of refugee law reform, another
important REFNET goal has been, through a number of
unique projects, to raise public awareness on refugee issues,
particularly focusing on those who identify themselves as
“ordinary citizens.” In addition to distributing colourful
and catchy flyers on refugee issues, REFNET has been en-
gaged in such activities as dispatching asylum seekers and
lawyers or activists to local schools to educate students
about refugee issues within Japan. With donations collected
by REFNET, the first Afghan restaurant in Kanda, Tokyo,
which is run by refugees themselves, was opened in Febru-
ary 2003. REFNET is planning several events in which
Japanese citizens and asylum seekers and refugees, not only
from Afghanistan but also from all over the world, can meet
and become acquainted with each other (as one can easily
imagine, for many of the Japanese participants, it may be
their first time to see people from certain countries). What
is remarkable about these projects is that they are being
spearheaded by young activists, many of whom are partici-
pating in social activism for the first time in their lives.
Below, I would like to closely look at why these relatively
young activists, who until recently have been rarely seen in
the ranks of migrants and refugee rights activists, have
become involved in the Free Afghans and Refugee Law
Reform Campaign after September 11.
AFNET, REFNET and Young Activists
(Before I came here) I felt impatient about the fact that I was not
doing anything to help people seeking help right here (in Japan).
I’m tired of living as if I’m not seeing anything, dragged by a
huge power, being sad …. Usually, I don’t talk about serious
stuff (i.e., politics and human rights etc.), but here, I feel com-
fortable talking about them. To be honest, I didn’t know any-
thing about what’s going on, but nobody made fun of me or
anything for that. I feel relieved because there’re so many young
people like me! (Female, in her twenties, after participating in a
refugee rights meeting).49
Since the beginning of the Free Afghans Movement, the
young members of such groups as Chance!50 and Peace
Boat,51 many of them in their teen and twenties, have deeply
involved themselves in collective AFNET and REFNET ac-
tivities, as well as engaging in their own unique activism as
a separate group. Chance!, a citizens’ group made up of
“ordinary citizens,” became mobilized immediately after
September 11, largely via mass e-mailing, and conducted a
series of peace walks (a total of five thousand participated in
the seventeen walks they conducted). The first peace walks
bore anti-war themes but some of the later ones focused on
the effort to free Afghan asylum seekers. Chance! had a peak
of two thousand members on their mailing list, where mes-
sages on a range of activist issues were exchanged. Many
students and young artists, such as singers, painters, design-
ers, and comedians, became involved in the Free Afghans
movement, and some conducted street performances on
behalf of Afghan detainees. They put their various talents to
use in an effort to raise public awareness on the issue. As a
comment on the plight of detainees, some built and entered
a plastic cage talking to passersby. Some composed songs on
detainees. Many of these young activists state their belief that
Japanese youth today tend to be apolitical and indifferent to
social problems happening around them. To address this
concern, Chance!’s slogan, prominently displayed on their
website, is “Change our Indifference into Awareness!.”
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The media played a critical role in these young people
becoming mobilized in support of refugee rights after Sep-
tember 11. Following the attacks, television and radio sta-
tions, newspapers and magazines began publishing and
broadcasting the World Trade Center tragedy on a daily
basis, as well as the U.S. attack on Afghanistan and its
devastation. Attorney Ohashi, one of the leading lawyers
devoting himself to pro bono work at the Lawyers League on
behalf of Afghan refugees, states:
One of the reasons why today’s Japanese society is not ‘refugee-
friendly’ is because most Japanese citizens have such limited
knowledge about what is going on in the world … about the
poverty, ethnic conflict, war, internally displaced persons and
refugees, and the unfair world structure that produces these
issues. This time, because of the huge media coverage presenting
the tragedy of Afghanistan over and over, a situation that is
pretty extraordinary for Japanese society emerged … Boom!
suddenly, everybody knew of the perilous situation in Afghani-
stan, and where this group of asylum seekers were coming
from.52
This can further be explained by the comments of some
of the young members of a newly founded group called
“RAFIQ” (in Dari, Afghan Persian, “friends”), which works
on behalf of refugees in the Osaka area. In October 2002,
the founders of RAFIQ conducted a hunger strike demand-
ing that the Immigration Bureau release detained asylum
seekers. Twenty people participated. One of the leading
members, a twenty-one-year-old, wrote to other refugee
supporters about his changing awareness of social issues
through his involvement in the refugee rights movement:
It has only been two days since I started the strike, but it’s already
getting tough. Today I went into a supermarket to get some
water, and was surprised: There is so much food here! I just
didn’t realize how wealthy Japan was … I imagined children
starving in Afghanistan, thinking how hard it must be to be
starving to death … (Japanese, male, twenty-one).53
Although the comment may appear naïve, it remains impor-
tant to the extent that it reflects a change, though small, that
is occurring in Japan. It may be argued that the events of
September 11 brought many “indifferent” citizens in Japan
to realize the unfairness of much of the global political
structure, as well as the fact that they are indirectly respon-
sible for what is happening in the world. Many have come
to realize that the luxuries they enjoy, which they take for
granted, has come at the expense of those in the South and
even refugees within their own country and at the expense
of those excluded under the governmental efforts to main-
tain a homogeneous social order.
Conclusion
Following the events of September 11, the government of
Japan stepped up regulations against aliens, including asy-
lum seekers, with a renewed agenda to counter terrorism.
The change became most visible in the form of collaboration
between the police and the immigration authorities. The
post-September 11 detention of Afghan asylum seekers was
an emotionally charged and publicly visible issue that pro-
vided an impetus for the refugee rights movement to take
shape on a national level, mobilizing a wide range of people,
the young and the old, who identify themselves as “main-
stream citizens.” Their protest against detention of Afghan
asylum seekers has not only succeeded in releasing detainees,
but also promoted reform of the asylum system. The
Shengyang incident further fuelled this activism, culminat-
ing in the revised refugee recognition bill that would poten-
tially prevent unfair detention and deportation of asylum
seekers. The bill is expected be submitted to the Diet during
the current session. The post-September 11 propagation of
the refugee rights movement has as its backdrop the rapid
maturation of the movement preceding the terrorist attacks
in New York. The events of September 11 and extensive
media coverage on the plight of Afghanistan stirred many
citizens in Japan to realize the inequities in the global politi-
cal structure and the contradictions found in a society where
aliens, including asylum seekers, are marginalized under the
government’s efforts to maintain a homogeneous social order.
At the same time, there is concern that, while Afghan
detainees have attracted much public and media attention,
other groups such as Burmese and Kurdish from Turkey,
who make up of the largest percentage of total refugee
applicants in Japan, have not received as much public at-
tention as the Afghans. In that light, it is REFNET’s job to
encompass the issues of rights of asylum seekers of all
nationalities, and shed light on their conditions. Also,
throughout AFNET’s and REFNET’s activities, there has
been little attempt54 to share experiences with refugee rights
groups and campaigns in other countries. In my view, given
the industrialized governments’ increasing security con-
cerns and attempts to link “counterterrorism measures”
with immigration on a global level, it is crucial for REFNET
to cooperate with movements abroad.
Lastly, I would like to quote a message from Sadako
Ogata, the former UNHCR, published in one of the forums
on refugee law reform in November 2002, which harshly
criticized the current Japanese asylum policy:
… (The small number of refugees accepted every year) leads to
the question if Japan has really  understood and tried to practice
the spirit and the values embodied in the Refugee Convention.
One of the reasons for Japan’s asylum policy being like this
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(exclusionary) may be because of our prejudice and discrimi-
nation (against foreigners) based on the pure-ethnic group
myth. However, there is no way that we can hold on to the
illusion in today’s globalized era. We need to overcome our
insular spirit and xenophobia, and become able to relate to
various problems in the world as our problems, not somebody
else’s.55
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